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Civil No. 7931

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND E. CRANFORD, sometimes known as
· Roland Cranford, and FRED · C. CLEMORE,
sometimes known as Fred Clemore,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.H. SPENCER GIBBS, sometimes known as H. S.
t~ • . .Gibbs, and IDA PEARL GIBBS, husband and
wife; DELONE JENSEN, sometimes known as
Dalone Jensen and also as Delone R. Jensen, and
ESTELL JENSEN, husband and wife; W.
DANA GIBBS, sometimes known as Dana Gibbs,
and VERLIE GIBBS, husband and wife;
'
HOWELL MINING COMPANY, a corporation;
· .'.. ' R. H. T. DUNSMORE and JANE DOE DUNS... · MORE, husband and wife; URBAN JOHNSON
. · and JANE DOE JOHNSON, husband and wife;
, :eHIL ROSEQUIST AND ROSE ROSEQUIST,
.. husband and wife; WALTER J. CROPPER and
. AILEEN CROPPER, husband and wife; MAN~l· ~ · TON C. GIBBS and FLORA B. GIBBS, husband
~~. , , .a nd wife; RICHARD R. KENNEDY, sometimes
known as Richard Kennedy, and ANITA GAE
KENNEDY, husband and wife; FIRST DOE ;
· · SECOND DOE; THIRD DOE; FOURTH DOE;
' · FIFTH DOE ; and SIXTH DOE ; and all other
persons unknown claiming any right, title, in, . terest o.r estate in or lien upon the mining claims
described in Plaintiffs' Complaint and in the
pleadings herein adverse to Plaintiffs' ownership
or clouding their title thereto,
Defendants and Respondents.
•

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS
Appeal from the DistriCt Court of the Sixth Judicial District
, .A,.
· . i-!l .an~_~fM- the County of Sevier
.... ~\ · · · .
·.,·~. '\ ~()NORABLE JOHN L. SEVY, JR., Judge
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· . .'• CARYEL MATTSSON
. . ·. · and
·
. . · JO.H N T. VERNIEU
FOR GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants
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IN THE SUPREME COUR:T
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND E. CRANFO):tD, sometimes known as
Roland Cranford, and FRED C. CLEMORE,
sometimes known as Fred Clemore,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs.H. SPENCER GIBBS, sometimes known as H. S.
Gibbs, and IDA PEARL GIBBS, husband and
wife; DELONE JENSEN, sometimes known as
Dalone Jensen and also as Delone R. Jensen, and
ESTELL JENSEN, husband and wife; W.
DANA GIBBS, sometimes known as Dana Gibbs,
and VERLIE GIBBS, husband and wife;
HOWELL MINING COMPANY, a corporation;
R. H. T. DUNSMORE and JANE DOE DUNSMORE, husband and wife; URBAN JOHNSON
and JANE DOE JOHNSON, husband and wife; Civil No. 7931
PHIL ROSEQUIST AND ROSE ROSEQUIST,
husband and wife; WALTER J. CROPPER and
AILEEN CROPPER, husband and wife; MANTON C. GIBBS and FLORA B. GIBBS, husband
and wife; RICHARD R. KENNEDY, sometimes
known ·as Richard Kennedy, and ANITA GAE
KENNEDY, husband and wife; FIRST DOE;
SECOND DOE; THIRD DOE; FOURTH DOE;
FIFTH DOE; and SIXTH DOE; and all other
persons unknown claiming any right, title, interest or estate in or lien upon the mining claims
described in Plaintiffs' Complaint and in the
pleadings herein adverse to Plaintiffs' ownership
or clouding their title thereto,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS

This is an action to quiet title to certain mining
claims situate in the Durkee Mining District, Piut~
County, Utah, wherein the Defendants counterclaimed
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to quiet title in themselves to conflicting mining claims.
Plaintiffs appeal from a Decree of the Sixth Judicial
District Court in and for Piute County, Utah, which determined that Plaintiffs' mining claims were \\:ithout any
validity and were subsequent and inferior to the mining
locations of the Defendants and by which the Court
quieted title in the Defendants H. Spencer Gibbs, son1etimes known as H. S. Gibbs, W. Dana Gibbs, someti1nes
known as Dana Gibbs, Del one Jensen, sometimes known
as Dalone Jensen and also as Del one R. Jensen, I\ianton
C. Gibbs, Richard R. Kennedy, sometimes known as
Richard Kennedy, and Walter J. Cropper. Appellants
also appeal from the Order of said Court denying their
Motion for a New Trial. These Appellants contend that
the lower Court has misapplied proven facts and that
said Decree is clearly against the weight of the evidence,
sufficient to merit a reversal of said Decree or a new
trial of this cause upon the merits.
S·TATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced by the filing of an Application for Appointment for Guardian Ad Litem for
Roland E. Cranford, a minor, one of the Plaintiffs, on
October 11, 1950 (R. 1). Thereafter the Court made and
entered its Order appointing Lucy H. Cranford ClenlOI'C
as such Guardian Ad Litem (R. 4). Plaintiffs' Con1plaint
(R. 6) was filed November 1, 1950. In it, Plaintiffs alleged that on or prior to the 31st day of May, 1950, tlw
premises therein described as Juanita #1, #2 and #~~
Mining Claims were vacant, unoccupied and unclai1ned
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lands of the United States of An1erica, subject to location
under the mining la-\vs thereof; that upon said date, the
Plaintiffs and one Kent F. Clemore entered upon and
explored said premises and found thereon rock in place
bearing valuable minerals; and that thereupon they located and appropriated as and for mining claims said
properties in the manner and method therein stated, including the erection and location of monuments and the
posting and recording of written Notices of Location.
Plaintiffs also alleged that on or prior to the 20th day of
July, 1950, the premises therein described as Debra F'raction #10 Mining Claim was vacant, unoccupied and unclaimed lands of the United States of America, subject
to location under the mining laws thereof; that upon said
date the Plaintiffs and one Kent F~. Clemore entered upon
and explored said premises and found thereon rock in
place bearing valuable minerals; and that thereupon they
located and appropriated as and for mining claim said
property in the manner and method therein stated, including the erection and location of monuments and the
posting and recording of written Notices of Location. It
was then alleged that said Plaintiffs, at all times since
said respective locations, have remained in possession
of said claims and have worked and improved the same
in compliance with the mining laws and customs of Utah
and the United States of America.
Plaintiffs then alleged in their Complaint that the
D·efendants pretended to have, own and claim certain alleged mining claims referred to as Yell ow Canarie #1, #2
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and #3, Yell ow Canarie Fraction and Yell ow Canarie
Fraction #2 in the same physical area as Plaintiffs·
Claims, and conflicting therewith, and that by reason
thereof Defendants claimed some right, title, interest or
equity in and to the claims of the Plaintiffs, or son1e part
thereof, and that said right, title, interest or equity thus
claimed by Defendants was without any validity whatsoever insofar as it conflicted with Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs prayed for a Decree quieting their title.
By way of Answer (R. 15) the answering Defendants H. Spencer Gibbs, sometimes kno"\vn as H. S. Gibbs,
and Ida Pearl Gibbs, husband and wife, W. Dana Gibbs,
sometimes known as Dana Gibbs, and Verlie Gibbs, husband and wife, Del one Jensen, sometimes kno'vn as
Dalone Jensen and also as Del one R. Jensen, and Estell
Jensen, husband and wife, Manton C. Gibbs and Flora B.
Gibbs, husband and wife, Richard R. Kennedy, son1etin1es
known as Richard Kennedy, and Anita Gae Kennedy,
husband and wife, a.nd Walter J. Cropper and Aileen
Cropp·er, husband and wife, and Phil Rosequist and Rose
Rosequist, husband and wife, denied all of Plaintiffs' allegations except for the recordation of Plaintiffs' Notices
of Location. Said D·efendants also counterclai1ned (R.
16) and alleged that on or prior to the respective dates
therein mentioned extending from April 25, 1949, to
s:eptember 27' 1950, the premises therein described as
Yellow Canarie #1, #2 and #3, Yell ow Canarie -F'raction,
Yellow Canarie Fraction #1, #2 and #4 (italics ours) 'vere
vacant, unoccupied and unclaimed lands subject to lora-
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tion under the n1ining laws of Utah and the United States
of America: that upon specific dates therein named, certain of said answering Defendants entered upon said
lands and located and appropriated the same for mining
clanns; and that said Defendants have at all times remained in possession thereof and have worked and iinproved said claims in compliance with law. Defendants
alleged that Plaintiffs' pretended claims in the same area
were without any legal validity whatever insofar as they
conflicted with Defendants' claims, and pTayed for a
Decree quieting their title.
By Amended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 23) the
same Defendants alleged the recording of certain Amended Notices of Location on Yell ow Canarie #1, #2 and #3
Mining Claims. They also added to the list of Claims upon which they were seeking to quiet title the following:
Independence, Independence Fraction, Anita Gae #1,
Grover Gibbs F'raction, Grover Gibbs F'raction #2, Lucky
Strike #2, and the Claim known as the "Fraction".
Plaintiffs' Reply (R. 32) denied each and every allegation of Defendants' Amended Counterclaim.
After the trial, the Court made and entered Findings
of .Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 38) in substantial
conformity to the allegations of said Amended Counterclaim, and by Decree (R. 50) quieted title in the Defendants named therein to all of the claims set forth in said
Amended Counterclaim except that in neither the Find-:
ings and Conclusions n~r Decree is any mention made
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whatsoever of the Grover Gibbs Fraction, Yellow Canarie
Fraction #1 #2 and #4 all four of 'vhich Claims the
'
'
Counterclaiming Defendants sought to quiet title to in
their . A. 1nended Counterclaim. The objections urged to
said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to
said Decree in Plaintiffs' 1\Iotion for aNew Trial (R.. 53)
went to the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
Judgn1ent and Decree entered; that the Judgment and
Decree were against the law, and that the Court committed error in law. Plaintiffs' Motion for a New
Trial was denied by Order of the Court dated October·
~4, 1952 (R. 54).
Subsequent to the location of Plaintiffs' claims, Kent'
F. Clemore, one of the locators thereof, and his wife,
conveyed to the Plaintiff, Fred C. Clemore, all of their
right, title and interest in and to the Juanita #1, #2 and
#3, and Debra Fraction #10 Mining Claims, Exhibit 7.
At the commencement of the trial, the action was dismissed without prejudice as to the Defendants R. H. T.
Dunsmore and Jane Doe Dunsmore, husband and 'vife:
Urban Johnson and Jane Doe Johnson, husband and
wife; First Doe, Second Doe, Third Doe, F'ourth Doe,
Fifth Doe and Sixth Doe, and any and all unknown defendants named in the action (R. 73). The sole remaining
Defendant who did not Answer and Counterclai1n, Howell
Mining Company, a corporation, filed no responsiYt~
pleading, made no appearance, the action was not dismissed as to it, its default was never entered, and the
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Court's Decree contained no judgment for or against
this D·efendant.
Uranium-bearing ores were discovered in commercial
quantities in the area surrounding Marysvale, Piute
County, Utah, in the year 1948 (R. 566). This discovery
started a "Uranium Rush" and a large number of mining
claims were located by various pers,ons, including 65
claims by the Defendant, H. Spencer Gibbs (R. 313).
Plaintiffs contend that on April 25, 1949, the Defendants
H. Spencer Gibbs, Dana Gibbs and Del one Jensen located two mining claims referred to as Yell ow Canarie
#1 and Yellow Canarie #2, and that said claims were
originally established two miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah, along the old Piute County Highway leading
from Marysvale to Monroe, Utah. Plaintiffs further contend that some time thereafter said mining claims and
the monuments and markers in connection therewith were
moved from their original physical locations along said
old County Highway to an entirely new area located one
and one-half to two miles north of the point of original
location. No new Notices of Location were posted, nor
were new Notices recorded, as required by law, at that
time, reliance being had upon the original Notices of
Location and the recordings thereof. Hence, Plaintiffs
take the position that Defendants' claims as moved and
re-established in the new area were and are null and
void, and that therefore this land was vacant and unoccupied and subject to location and appropriation as and
for mining claims by the Plaintiffs, who located their

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

claims in said new area prior to the actual date of recordation of amended Notices on the original Yellow
Canarie Claims, or the location of new and additional
claims in said new area.
Plaintiffs' case is grounded upon the long established
principal of law that once a locator of mining claims establishes his claims at a given location, erects discovery
monuments and corner stakes, and posts and records
Notices of Location, describing the physical location of
said claims by reference to some natural object or perInanent monument as will identify the claims, he is thereafter bound by his own actions and declarations and he
may not at a later date move the physical location of said
claims to a new area and claim this as his own by relying
upon his original locations and recordings and the priority they otherwise would give him. Instead, if he desires
to locate a new area, he must do so in full con1pliance
with the Statutes the same as if the original locations
in the abandoned area had never been made and must
start anew and take each required step without seeking
to gain any benefit or priority out of the original locations.
In this Brief and for purposes of clarity, the area
where Plaintiffs contend that Defendant H. Spencer
Gibbs originally located his Yellow Canarie Claims, which
is located approximately two 1niles northeast of 1\farysvale, Utah, along the east side of the Old Piute County
Highway, and which is shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit ()
midway between the N. and S. boundaries of Section 1n,
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To,vnship 27 South, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
and near the west boundary of said S:ection 16, will be
hereinafter referred to as ~'Area #1". Also, the area
vvhere Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants subsequently moved the Yellow Canarie Claims without any
compliance with governing law as to posting and recording of nevv Notices of Location and \Vhere the Defendants chose to locate numerous other conflicting and
overlapping claims for the purpose of confusing the
entire situation and camouflaging their moving and
transplanting of the Yellow Canarie Claims, which area
is situated near the center of Section 4, Township 27
South, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 5) and is outlined in a red square on Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 6, will hereinafter be referred to as "Area #2".
The testimony and evidence concerning these and
other matters is voluminuos and will be reviewed in detail in connection with the argwnents hereinafter made.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
THAT THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY OFFERED
AND RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS AND IS
ENTIRELY INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE DECISION
MADE AND THE DECREE RENDERED.

POINT 2.
THAT THE DECREE ENTERED HEREIN IS AGAINST
THE LAW.
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POINT 3.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN.
LAW.

POINT 4.
THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AND RECORD IN. THIS CAUSE, NEW FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ENTERED.

POINT 5.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

ARGU·MENT
POINT 1.
THAT THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY OFFERED
AND RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS AND IS
ENTIRELY INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE DECISION
MADE AND THE DECREE RENDERED.

This is an action in equity. The scope of review on
appeal in equity cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction.
"This Court is authorized by the State Constitution to review the findings of the trial eourt in
equity cases, but the findings of the trial eourts
on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unlP~~
it manifestly appears that the court has IHi~np
plied proven faets or 1nade findings elearly
against the weight of the evidence."
Olivero vs. Eleganti, 61 l 1 tah -t. 7:>, ~I ..f. P.
313.
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To the sa1ne effect is Stanley vs. Stanley, 97 Utah
520, 94 P. 2d 465, in 'vhich the Court collates the authorities on this point. \V e concede, therefore, that Plaintiffs, in order to succeed on this appeal, have the burden
of convincing this Court that the lower Court misapplied
proven facts and made Findings clearly against thl~
weight of the evidence. For convenience and clarity, the
pivotal issues of fact upon 'vhich a correct determination .depends will be grouped and argued as follows:
A. Original location of Defendants' Yellow Canarie
Claim in Area #1 along the old Piute County Highway,
approximately two miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah.
B. Subsequent moving of Defendants' Yellow
Canarie Claims by the Defendants to Area #2 located
approximately two miles north of their original point of
establishment and without new recordation of Notices
of Location or compliance with other statutory requirements.
C. Manner, method and place of location and establishment of Plaintiffs' claims in Area #2.
D. Subsequent acts of Defendants ih moving,
amending, modifying, confusing, and overlapping claims
in Area #2, including making of conflicting new locations.
A. ORIGINAL LOCATION OF DEFENDANTS' YELLOW
CANARIE CLAIMS IN THE AREA #1 ALONG THE OLD
PIUTE COUNTY HIGHWAY, APPROXIMATELY TWO
MILES NORTHEAST OF MARYSVALE, UTAH.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 consists of two United States
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Geographical Survey Quadrangle Sheets stapled together
showing all of the outstanding physical characteristics
of the land surrounding Marysvale, Utah, and involved
in this litigation. These sheets bear a date of 1945 and
show existing conditions as of that time. They show,
among other things, that a "graded road" extends in a
northerly direction from Marysvale, Utah, into Sections
21, 16 and 9 of Township 27 South, Range 3 \Vest of the
Salt Lake Base and Meridian (R. 118). A. R. Shelton,
licensed United States Mineral Surveyor, fixed the location of the area now covered by Plaintiffs' and Defendants' disputed mining claims (Area #2) as being in Section 4, Township 27 South, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, and he enclosed said area in a red
penciled square on Exhibit 6 (R. 118). This is the sam.e
area as shown by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5, which is a large
map of Area #2, prepared by Mr. Shelton, and " hirh
will be referred to in detail hereinafter.
7

Shelton testified that Exhibit 6 shows that the road
above referred to does not enter or approach the area
now in dispute (Area #2) but that it by-passes it to the
south by a distance of one mile (R. 119). According to
Exhibit 6 and according to the testimony of I)ratt ~r<'g
miller, the original discoverer of uraniu1n in the l\larysvale area who also owns mining claims in Area #2 (H.
204), there was neither road nor trail of any nature going
into, crossing or approaching the area included in the
red square on Exhibit 6 (R. 120), \Vhich is the area involved in the present litigation, prior to thP di~coVPl'Y
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of uraniun1 in Area #2 in 1948. This was true vvhen Defendants' claims were located in 1949 (R. 204).
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 is the original Notice of Location for Defendants' Yello\v Canarie #1 lvfining Claim.
The instrument bears the signature of H. Spencer G-ibbs
and is dated April 25, 1949. It refers to the location of
said Claim as being "one mile east of Sevier River on
Old County Highvray two miles North East of !1arysvale, Utah".
D·efendants' Exhibit "B" is a copy of the original
Location Notice of Defendants' Yello\v Canarie #2 Claim.
It is dated April 25, 1949. The location of this Clailn
is therein stated as follows : "Joins Yellow Canarie #1
on the north end line and is located two miles northeast
of Marysvale, Utah along Old County Highway". Defendants' Exhibit "C" is a copy of the original Location
Notice of Defendants' Yellow Canarie Clairn #3 dated
June 7, 1949. The location of this Claim is therein stated
as follows: "Joins Yellow Canarie west side line #2".
The physical location of the three claims described in
these Notices of Location was the subject of much of
Plaintiffs' evidence.
Fred C. Clemore, one of the Plaintiffs, an experienced miner, who resided at Marysvale, Utah, testified
that prior to December, 1949, he had heard certain .
"rumors and gossip" concerning the original location
of the Yellow Canarie Mining Claims and the subsequent
moving of these claims to new locations (R. 132). During
April or May, 1950, Pratt Seegmiller, the original dis-
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coverer of uranium-bearing ores in the Marysvale area,
pointed out to Clen1ore the exact original location of the
Yell ow Canarie Claims, including the large pinnacle or
cone-shaped formation of yellow colored rock which
served as the discovery monuument (R. 135). The ground
shovvn to Clemore was Area #1 located approximately
one and one-half miles south of the area enclosed in
the red square (Exhibit 6) and immediately adjoined
the right or east side of the Old County Highway as it
·extends north fron1 Marysvale, Utah (R. 136). Clemore
fixed the location of this area with an "X" or cross in
ink upon Exhibit 6 near the letters "BM" in the northwest quarter of Section 16, Township 27 South, Range 3
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (R. 164), and he
testified that the coloration of the rock here is distinctly
yellow (R. 165). H·e testified that he was present at this
spot when the original Notice of Location of Defendant
H. Spencer Gibbs on Yellow Canarie #1 was found at the
base of a cone-shaped discovery monument (R. 166).
Leonard Anderson, a resident of Elsinore, Utah, for 55
years, who is part owner of certain mining claims in
or near the disputed ·area, testified (R. 197 to R. 201)
that he had regularly traveled over the road leading fron1
Marysvale, Utah, across the Sevier River and thence
north to Monroe, Utah, for a number of years. During
all of this time the road had been commonly lmown to
the witness as "the Old Monroe Road" (R. 198), and it
had never entered, approached or crossed the area now
in dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendants (Area #2).
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Pratt Seegmiller, a resident of Marysvale for 15
years and the O\Yner of 1nining clain1s north of the area
in dispute in this action, testified (R.. 204) that he was
very familiar \Yith the road referred to above. For many
years, the name conunonly applied to this road has been
"the Old County Highway~'. This \Vitness testified that
at no time in his knowledge did this road enter the area
(Area #2) where Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Claims are
novv located and \Vhere Mr. s.eegmiller's Claims are like\Vise situated, but is removed therefrom a distance of
about two miles. A road now enters that a.rea but it
has been constructed recently and since the uranium development, it was not there when the claims in dispute
were located, and it is not now and never has been a part
of the Old County Highway (R. 204).
In June of 1949, Seegmiller had a conversation with
the Defendant, H. Spencer Gibbs (R. 208 to R. 210) concerning the fact that Mr. Seegmiller had discovered on
his Freedom Clain1s which are located immediately north
of the area covered by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 (R. 203), Location Notices, location monuments and markers referring to the establishment of the Yellow Canarie Clain1s
in that area. Seegmiller recalled distinctly that the Notice referred to Yellow Canarie Claim #2 and stated
" ... two·miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah, along the
old county highway" (R. 209). In said conversation SeegIniller said (R. 210) :
"Well, I said, 'the Old County Highway would
never have run up here, you must have made a
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mistake putting such a notice out there', and he
said 'Well, it must have been up through here', and
when I objected he said, 'vell, he used to run a
saddle horse up here a few years ago."
HoV\rever, we note that Gibbs' counsel took a different
view of· the location of said highway at the trial, for at
R. 204 appears the following:
"BY MR. MELVILLE: Your Honor, I object. We don't claim that the old county road goes
through there. There is no question about that
fact, and we will stipulate to it."
Subsequently, Mr. Seegmiller made an investigation to
determine the exact original location of the Yellow Canarie Claims. Early in July of 1949 he discovered at a
point located 300 feet fron1. the Old County Highway, approximately two miles north of the Marysvale Railroad
D·epot, a natural monument of yellow-colored rock in a
pinnacle-like' formation and under a pile of rocks on said
monument a can containing the Notice of Location for
Yell ow Canarie #1, bearing the signature of H. Spencer
Gibbs as the locator (R. 215 and 216). Seegmiller identified Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 as being the identical Notice
of Location he thus discovered in place at this point (R.
216). He fixed this place or point on the U. S. Geological
Survey Map, Exhibit 6, with a rectangular mark near
the center of Section 16 in the general Area #1. This
point is less than one-half the total distance fro1n l\farysvale to the area now in dispute between Plaintiffs and
Defendants. The natural coloration of the rock outcrop-
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pings in this area is distinctly yellow (R. 218). This
agrees with Clemore's descriptio~ of Area #1 (R. 164 and
R. 165), the testimony of Roland Lund (R. 257), John T.
"\:--ernieu (R. 261) and Ethel Seegmiller (R. 245).
By contrast, Clemore testified that the predominate
color of the natural rock outcroppings in Area #2 before
removal of overburden is grayish red (R. 165). Pratt ,
Seegmiller was of the same opinion (R. 219), as was his
wife, Ethel Seegmiller (R. 245).
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 is a photograph of the original
location of Yellow Canarie #1 at the point marked by
Seegmiller on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, showing the location
monument in the foreground and the County Highway in
the background with Mr. Seegmiller's truck parked thereon (R. 220). This photograph was taken about July 10,
1949, by Seegmiller or his wife.
Ethel Seegmiller, the wife of Pratt Seegmiller, corroborated her husband's testimony regarding the finding
of the location monument and Notice of Location of
Yellow Canarie #1 in Area #1 along the Old County
Highway (R. 242-243). She identified Plaintiffs' Exhibit
12 as the identical Notice of Location found on the scene
(R. 244). She also corroborated the testimony of other
of Plaintiffs' witnesses about the location and identity
of the "Old County Road" and about the yellow coloration in the Area #1, and testified as to the absence of
yellow coloration in Area #2 before the overburden is
removed ( R. 245).
Roland Lund, a resident of Marysval~ for 19 years,
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testified that he was very fa1niliar with the road running north and east of Marysvale, Utah, commonly known
as the "Old County Highway", and tha.t he had traYeled
it on many occasions (R. 254). In the su1nn1er of 1930,
Mr. Lund, while hunting, discovered a monun1ent approximately four feet high situated fifty feet east of said
road and approximately two miles northeasterly of
Marysvale upon· which were written words and figures
referring to the monument as being one of the corner
stakes of a Yellow Canarie Claim (R. 255). Lund described the coloration of the rock outcroppings in this
area as being predominately yellow. Mr. Lund was enlployed as a miner on the F'reedom Claims at the time of
the trial, and he estimated that the F·reedom #2 Clailn,
which is shown by other evidence to be in Area #2, was
approximately two miles northerly of the point of his
discovery of the Yell ow Canarie monument along the
"Old County Highway".
John T. Vernieu, one of Plaintiffs' counsel, testified
(R. 259 to 261) that on August 9, 1951 (five days before
the trial) while inspecting the original location of Yellow
Canarie #1 along the Old County Highway at a point
approximately one and one-half to two miles northeast
of Marysvale, in the company of F'red C. Clemore, he
came upon the original Notice of Location of Yell ow
Canarie #1, Exhibit 12. It was found in a tobacco can
under a pile of rocks at the top of a rock pinnacle about
300 feet east of the road (R. 260). It was stipulated hetween counsel that the signature on Exhibit 12 ,vns that
of Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs (R. 261).
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We submit that the foregoing testimony and evidence clearly establish that Y ello'v Canarie Claims #1,
#2 and #3 were originally located by the Defendant H.
Spencer Gibbs on April25, 1949, April25, 1949, and June
7, 1949, respectively, at a point approximately two miles
north and east of Marysvale, Utah, along the Old Piute
County Highway (Area #1). The original location monument and Notice of Location for Yellow Canarie #1 were
observed in this area by four witnesses at tin1es extending from early July, 1949, to August 9, 1951, and one of
these claims was seen
the corner monuments of one
by a fifth witness in Area #1 in the summer of 1950.
Plaintiff Clemore went so far as to say that it was
"rumor and gossip" that the Yellow Canarie Claims were
originally located in Area #1 and they thereafter had
"flown" ( R. 132) to Area #2. Furthermore, the Location Notices for Yellow Canarie #1 and #2 which were
admittedly prepared by Defendant Gibbs, who after all
should best know the true location of his claims, recite
upon their faces, both by reference to fixed and welldefined points (on or along Old County Highway and two
miles northeast of Marysvale), that they are located
precisely .where Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that they
found evidence of the same, and Yellow Canarie #3 is
tied to that same Area #1 by the recital in the Location
Notice thereof that it joins Yellow Canarie #2. We think
it significant that Defendants' record is barren of any
direct denial of the originalloca tion of these claims along
the Old County Highway. Moreover, as early as April
29, 1949, Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs knfJw that the area

of
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where he now contends that his Yellow Canarie Claiins
are located (Area #2) was not two miles northeast of
Marysvale, Utah, as he stated in his original Notices of
Location on Yellow Canarie Claims #1 and #2, but rather
that it was in fact four miles north of Marysvale, Utah,
as Plaintiffs' Exhibits 5 and 6 clearly show it to be, for
on April 29, 1949, four days after the location of Yellow
Canarie Claims #1 and #2, Gibbs located his alleged
Lucky Strike #2 in Area #2 and he fixed its location as
being "south of Pratt Seegmiller's Freedom Clain1 #3
and about four miles north of Marysvale" (Defendants'
Exhibit K, and R. 372 and 373). Defendants' own map
of Area #2 (Exhibit "AA") and Defendants' Exhibit Z,
when construed together, show that Freedom Claim
#3 and the alleged Lucky Strike #2 Claim are not 1nore
than 1500 feet north of where Defendant H. Spencer
Gibbs contends that his Yellow Canarie Claims were
properly located. Yet his own declarations as contained
in the Notices of Location above referred to, if they are
to be believed, would of necessity place Lucky Strike #2
and Yell ow Canarie #1, #2 and #3 at least two miles
apart. We are confident that this Court will look beyond
the flimsy film of confusion and the subterfuge thrown
up by Gibbs to gloss over his obvious removal of the
Yell ow Canarie Claims from their original locations in
Area #1 to new and greener pastures in Area #2. Surely,
Defendants should be bound by their own declarations
contained in their Notices of Location and ought not now
to be permitted to deny by indirection their o'vn locations.
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In order to arrive at a decision in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, the lo,ver Court must necessarily have concluded that the Yell ow Canarie Claims
#1 #'2 and #3 \Yere not located and established originally
'
in Area #1. To reach such conclusion the Court must
have ignored or misapplied the proven facts relative to
their original physical location in Area #1, brought out
by the Plaintiff Clemore and several disinterested witnesses, non-parties to this action. Any determination to
such effect is clearly contrary to the evidence and against
the weight thereof.
B. SUBSEQUENT MOVING OF DEFENDANTS' YELLO"V CANARIE CLAIMS BY DEFENDANTS TO AREA #2
LOCATED APPROXIMATELY TWO MILES NOR.TH OF
THEIR ORIGINAL POINT OF ESTABLISHMENT AND
WITHOUT NEW RECORDATION OF NOTICES OF LOCATION OR COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.

In considering the facts and discussions under the
instant Argument "B" devoted to the moving by Defendants of their claims fron1 Area #1 to Area #2, we respectfully urge the Court to keep in mind the original physical locations of said claims in Area #1 as shown by the
discussion under Argument "A" above. The proof clearly
shows that Yellow Canaries, #1, #2 and #3 were originally established in Area #1. Subsequently, they were
found to be in Area #2, the Defendants at all times relying on their original location dates to give priority in
time. All the items p·ointed out in Argument "B", when
considered in the light of the facts developed by Argu-
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1nent "A", including dates, descriptions, geographical
and physical characteristics of the two areas, spelling
of the word "Canarie", an1endments to locations, etc.,
lead to the conclusion that Defendants' clain1s "fie"~"
from Area #1 to Area #2, thus living up to their ornitho. logical appellations.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 is a large map prepared in
August and November, 1950, by A. R. Shelton, licensed
United States Mineral Surveyor (R.. 89 and 92). This
map covers substantially the same area as the property
herein referred to as Area #2 which is included in the
red square in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, in Section 4, Township 27 South, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, but is in great detail. The map shows the exact location of all monuments and corner stakes as determined
by Mr. Shelton to be actually existing upon the ground.
Defendants' Yellow Canarie Claims #1, #2 and #3 are designated in yellow thereon.
The discovery monument containing a notice of location dated April 25, 1949, and the northwest corner stake
of Yell ow Canarie #1 are shown in the upper righthand
corner of the map (Northeast part of Area #2). The
north and east sides thereof are shown in broken linP~
because the northeast corner stake was not found by
Shelton (R. 90). The only markers Mr. Shelton found
defining the south end line of a Yell ow Canarie Clain1
in the area covered by the upper part of Exhibit [) referred to the southwest corner, south end center and southeast corner of Yellow Canarie #2.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

In the lo,ver center of Exhibit 5, being the south
central part of the area covered thereby, are found various references to stakes and markers shown thereby to
be Yello"\v Canarie #2 and #3. Yello~u Ca,na.rie #3 is on
the left or west and 1~ ellow Ca.narie #2 is on the right or
east (R. 98 and R. 99). Within the boundaries of Yellow
Canarie #3 was found a location monument containing a
Notice of Location signed by H. Spencer Gibbs and others
dated June 7, 1949. Within the boundaries of Yellow
Canarie #2 "\Vas found a location monument and Notice of
Location bearing date of April 25, 1949. The monun1ents
and markers for Yellow Canarie #2 and #3 were "surveyed in" by Shelton between November 28 and N ovember 30, 1950 (R. 89 and' 98) . Additional location monuments and corner stakes referring to other claims purportedly located by Defendants in the same area were
also sho'vn on Exhibit 5, but these will be dealt with at a
later point herein.
The major part of the Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs'
testimony was directed to a detailed recital of the purported manner of establishing and locating the Yellow
Canarie Claims in Area #2. According to Gibbs, Yellow
Canarie #1 was established by him ,and his son, Dana
Gibbs, south of the Prospector Claims in the south central part of Area #2 on the morning of April 25, 1949 (R.
266). Thereafter, and on the same day, Gibbs contends he
went some 3,000 feet north of Yellow Canarie #1 where
he established Yellow Canarie #2 (R. 269). Thus) as
originally located) Gibbs states that Yellow Ca.narie #2
was north of Yellow Canarie #1.
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Notices of Location on these clailns were recorded
April 26, 1949. Early in May, 1949, Gibbs says that he
and Richard K.ennedy staked the claims and erected corner monuments (R. 271). Gibbs acknowledged that these
Claims as originally located in Area #2 had end lines
well within the Prosp·ector Claims (R. 271). Gibbs says
that he ()Jnd Del one Jensen then established Yellow Canarie #3 on June 7, 1949, south of the Prospector Claims
and west of Yellow Canarie #1 (R. 276), although the description in t;he Notice of Location of Yellow Canarie #3
says that it is west of Yellow Canarie #2 (Exhibit 3).
Robert Dunsmore, also known as R. I-I. T. Dunsmore,
and Urban Johnson, two of the defendants in this action
against whom the Complaint was dismissed, testified
that they assisted Mr. Gibbs in the staking of Yellow
Canarie. #1 and the north end line of Yell ow Canarie #2.
This occurred on June 13, 1949, and the work was performed under the direction of H. Spencer Gibbs (R. 232
and 233, and R. 24 7). They testified that Yell ow Canarie
#1 was staked out as the north claim, and that Yellow
Canarie #2 was staked as the south claim, so that the
north end line of Yell ow Canarie #2 was the same as the
south end line of Yellow Canarie #1. Yell ow Canarie #1
began at the northwest corner of Prospector Claim #2
and extended south over this claim from that point (R.
233 and R. 247). This testimony conflicts directly with
that of the Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs as to the locations of Yell ow Canarie #1 and #2.
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Thereafter, the original Notices of Location of. the
three Yell ow Canarie Claims were a1nended. The original
location of Yellow Canarie #1 was amended by Defendants' Exhibit "D". It is dated April25, 1949, but recorded
June 28, 1950. This amended Notice recites that its purpose is to "more fully describe this claim loca~tion to correct previou,s mistakes and di.screpancies." Exhibit "E",
the amendment of Yellow Canarie #2, is also dated April
25, 1949, but recorded June 27, 1950, and it recites that
it was made " ... for the purpose of more fully describing
the position to adjoining claims also to correct corner
posts numbers the changing of location notice by persons
unknown to me." Exhibit "F'", the amendment of Yellow
Canarie #3, is dated December 5, 1950, but recorded on
December 7, 1950. It was made " ... for the purpose of
correcting any errors in the original location and more:
accurately and definitely describing and defining the lo. ... "
cat1on
Under cross-examination H. Spencer Gibbs acknowledged that the amendments to the Yellow Canarie: Claims
had the effect of changing their size and shape despite
recitals contained in Exhibits "D" "E" and "F" to the
'
'
contrary (R. 325). Also, Gibbs acknowledged
(R. 327)
that the amendments on Yell ow Canarie #1 and #2 were
not made on the date recited thereon, but were actually
made on the dates rec'Orded, that is, on June 28, 1950, and
June 27, 1950. We quote from R. 327 as follows:
"Q.

Yellow Canarie #3 had been located between
the time of making your original location of
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Yellow Canarie #1 and the time you made
your amendment of #1; is that right~
A. The amendment was after we had located the
Canarie #3.

Q. But you still went back and relied on the
original location priority as of April 25, 19±9 '?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, on your amended Notice of Location
#1, you say in the line just above the words,
names of locators, 'Located this 25th day of
April, 1949'. You didn't make the amendlnent
on that date, did you~
A. Well, that ...
Q.

Answer the question. Did you make the
amendment on that date~
A. No.

Q. Whenever did you make the amendment?
A. Whenever it says on the paper.
Q. June 28, 1950; isn't that right~
A. That is the date."
We submit that the testimony of Shelton and Gibbs
clearly establishes that the Yellow Canarie Claims "flew''
to new locations approximately one and one-half 111iles
north of their original locations along the Old Piute
County Highway. There can be no doubt that there is
substantial evidence of the reestablishment of the \' rllow
Canarie Claims in Area #2 (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 5 and (i).
However, we most earnestly contend that the weight of
the evidence clearly establishes that the Yello'v CanariP
Claims previously had been located som0 distanre south,
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their original physical locations having been in Area #1.
If this b~sic premise of Plaintiffs' case is established,
then the conclusion appears to us to be obvious, to-wit:
that these claims "\vere moved to new and different locations at some date between their original date of location
along "the old county highway" in 1949, and the filings of
amended Notices of Location in 1950, the Amended Notices having been made subsequent to Plaintiffs' Locations.
Gibbs at all times relied upon his original Notices of
Location on the Yellow Canarie Claims to establish priority of time, even though these Notices recited upon their
faces that the claims were situated one and one-half to
tvvo miles south of the place where they are now shown
to be, Exhibit 5. The amendments to the original locations were made on June 28, and December 5, 1950, more
than a year after the original locations. These amendments, Defendants' Exhibits "D", "E", and "F'", do not
purport to be new locations, but they recite that they
are made " ... to more. fully describe this claim location
to correct previous mistakes and discrepancies", Exhibit
''D"; also, " ... for the purpose of more fully describing
the position to adjoining claims also to correct corner
post numbers ... ", Exhibit "E"; and also " ... for the
purpose of correcting any errors in the original location
of Inore accurately and definitely describing and defining
the location ... ",Exhibit "F". However, Gibbs may have
denominated the purpose of these amendments, we subnut that the evidence clearly establishes that the real
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purpose thereof was a belated attempt to cover up his
moving the claims to a totally new and different area and
to place on record descriptions which would confor1n to
his transfer.
The amended Notice of Location on Yell ow Canarie
#1, Exhibit "D", fixes the location of the Claim in 1950
as being south of the Buddy some 875 feet. The Buddy
Claim is north of the area shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5.
This is at least one and one-half miles north of any point
to which the Yellow Canarie #1 Claim was tied by its original Notice of Location, Exhibit 12. If the amendment
was made merely to correct the original location, Gibbs
would have found it unnecessary to change the physical
location by such amendment to an entirely new and different area one and one-half miles north of the original
location. The same is true of the amendment of Yellow
Canarie #2, Exhibit E. This amendment recites that as of
June 27, 1950, the claim is situated north of the Prospector Claims. The Prospectors are located in the north
part of the area shown by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. This is
about four miles north and east of Marysvale, Utah.
The original Notice of Location for Yell ow Canarie #2,
Exhibit "B", recites that the Claim is only two 1niles
northeast of Marysvale, Utah. If Gibbs made the anwndment merely to correct the original Notice of Location for
this claim, why was it necessary for him to amend the location and tie it to an entirely new and different areaf
Further, the original Notice of Location on ·vellow
Canarie #3, Exhibit "C", recited that the Clai1n joined
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the 'vest side line of Yellow Canarie #2. By reference to
the description contained in the original Location Notice
of Yellow Canarie #2, this \vould 111ean that Yellow Canarie #3 \Yas located in Area #1. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6
shows that Area #1, which is about two miles northeast
of 1\:Iarysvale, Utah, would be in the northvvest quarter of
Section 16, Township 27 South, Range 3 West, Salt Lake
Meridian. I-Iowever, in his amendment to Yellow Canarie
Claim #3, Gibbs saw fit to change the location of. the
claim to a point near the center of Section 4, To,vnship 27
South, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
for he used these words, Exhibit "F·", "... The discovery
monument of this claim is situate 2565 feet S·outh and
1626 feet East of the· Northwest corner of Section 4,
Township 27 South, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, ... ". This is one and one-half to two miles
north of the place to which original Notice of Location
for Yellow Canarie Claim #3 was tied. Again we must
ask, if Gibbs was relying upon the original physical location of the Yellow Canarie #3 claim when he amended
his location thereof, why did he see fit to fix the location
of the Claim by amendment at a point one an one-half
to two miles north of the place where his original Notice
of Location established the claim~
We think that this Court will find the answer to these
questions to be obvious. There can be but one answerthe three Yellow Canarie Claims were moved by Gibbs
to new and entirely different locations some time after
their original establishment, and Gibbs saw fit to lend

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30

so1ne measure of respectability to his original locations
by belated changes in the descriptions through amendments. He wanted to rely upon his original Location Notices in order to establish his priority of location. After
movement of the Claims to "new and greener pastures,"
it was necessary to adjust somehow the descriptions to
confor1n to the physical facts. It is acknowledged that no
one actually saw Gibbs or any other of the Defendants
move the Yellow Canarie Claims from their original locations along the Old Piute County ~ghway, about two
miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah, to their new location
in the area covered by Plaintiffs' Exhibits 5 and 6. The
evidence is very largely circumstantial. Even so, "'e
contend that the evidence is so strong in Plaintiffs' favor
and so clearly establishes the movement of the Yellow
Canarie Claims to an entirely new and different area
without benefit of new and independent locations and
recordings that the trial Court's apparent Findings to
the contrary were clearly against the weight of the evidence sufficient to merit a reversal of its decision by this
Court.
C. MANNER AND METHOD OF LOCATION OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS.

The three Juanita Mining Claims and the Debra
Fraction #10 Mining Claim were located within the area
outlined in red in Section 4, Township 27 South, Range
3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, Area
#2. These Claims are outlined in blue on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. Juanita Claims #1, #2 and #3 were located on
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May 30, 1950, by Kent F. Cle1nore, Fred C. Clemore and
Roland E. Cranford, and the Notices of Location thereof
were recorded on ~tlay 31, 1950, Plaintiffs' Exhibits #1,
2 and 3. Debra Fraction #10 Claim was located by said
persons on July :20, 1950, and the Notice of Locatio.n was
recorded on July 31, 1950, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4. Subsequent to the location of said clain1s, Kent F. Clemore and
wife quitclaimed all of their right, title and interest i~
the Claims to the Plaintiff Fred C. Clen1ore, Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 7.

Fred C. Clemore testified that during the spring of
1950 he became interested in the mining property within
Area #2. Information came to hi1n regarding the establishment of the Yellow Canarie Claims within. this area
(R. 134). He exan1ined the recorded Notices of Location
for the Yellow Canarie Claims in the office of the Piute
County Recorder (R. 139). At this time no Amended
Notices of Location on the Yellow Ca.narie Claims had
been recorded. The original. Notices of Location then of
record identified the location of these claims as being
situated two miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah, and
along the Old County Highway (R. 140). From the reading of said Notices, which by virtue of the recitals therein
referred to the Claims as being in Area #1, and by
reason of the fact that Clemore had observed certain
Yellow Canarie monuments and stakes within the area
herein referred to as Area #2, he concluded that the Yellow Canarie Claims had been moved from their original
locations in Section 16 and had "flown" to one and one-
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half to two miles north into the Area #2 in S.ection 4 without benefit of new recordings or other compliance with
statutory requirements. He therefore concluded that
the ground covered by the Yell ow Canarie Claims in Section 4, Exhibits 5 and 6, was vacant land and was open to
location for mining claims (R. 183). On May 30, 1950,
Clemore and Roland Cranford 'vent into Area #2 covered
by Exhibit 5 for the purpose of locating mining claims.
Clemore described the natural coloration of the terrain
in this area as being grayish red, as distinguished from
the predominate yellow coloring of the terrain in Section 16, where the Yellow Canarie Claims were originally
located (R. l65).
After Plaintiffs located the boundaries of adjoining claims and ascertained that they were not. interfering
therewith (R. 141 and 149), they dug into the ground
in search of an ore discovery. Uranium bearing ores
were identified in place by Clemore through the use of a
Geiger Counter on all three of the properties located as
Juanita Claims (R. 141). Assays were also made by
Clemore and in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 142). Thereafter, location monuments consisting of rock piles with
2x4's placed in the middle thereof were erected on the
sites, and Notices of Location were prepared and placed
in tobacco cans under the monuments on each of the
claims (R. 142). Juanita Claim #1 was located as the
middle or central claim, and Juanita #3 and #2 were located west and east thereof, respectively (R. 14:2-143).
Copies of the original Notices were filed for record the
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next day, ~lay 31, 1950. The discovery monuments for
Juanita Claims #1 and #2 'vere identified and "surveyed
in" by A. R. Shelton at the time he prepared Exhibit 5
(R. 103) in substantially the same position as originally
established. The discovery monument of Juanita #3
was not identified or "surveyed in" by Shelton, but Clemore fixed the location thereof with a circled cross a pproximately one-half inch south on Exhibit 5 of the
south boundary of the Prospector #4 Clain1 at a- point
approximately 20 feet east of an access road which now
crosses the claim (R. 147). The corner and end center
stakes on Juanita #1 and #2 were erected on May 31,
1950. While erecting the same, Clemore observed, within
the area located by him, monuments, stakes and markers
referring to the Yellow Canarie Claims. At this time
Yellow Canarie #2 was situated in the same area as the
location of Juanita #2, and Juanitas #1 and. #3 were located in the same general area as Yellow Carn.arie #3 (R.
150). Clemore did not observe sufficient markers or
monuments in this immediate area to enable him to
identify the existence of any Yellow Canarie #1 Claim.
Clemore testified that at the time of location of his
Juanita Claims he did not find any evidence of conflict
between his Juanita Claims and any other claims of the
Defendants, although he made a careful search of the
area (R. 154), nor were any markers or stakes found referring to the location of Anita Gae, Lucky Strike #2,
Grover Gibbs Fraction, Fraction, or Yellow Canarie
Fractions #1, #2 and #4 within the boundaries of the
Juanita Claims (R. 155). However, at a later date, mark..
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ers and monuments referring to the location of this area
by Defendants under Claim names last set forth abo·\ye
began to appear in this area.
Debra Flraction #10 Claim was located by Clen1ore
and Cranford on July 20, 1950, and a copy of the original
Notice of Location was recorded on July 31, 1950. This
claim is shown in the northeast part of the area covered
by Exhibit 5, and is outlined in blue (R. 156). Some evidence of the Yellow Canarie Claim #2 was observed near
the south boundary of this Claim at the time of location
(R. 159). The same procedure with reference to determination of boundaries of adjoining claims, discovery
of uranium-bearing ores in place, erection of discovery
monument, preparation, posting and recording of Notice
of Location, and staking of corner and end center nlonuments as was followed in locating the Juanita Clailns,
was employed by Clemore on the Debra Fraction #10
(R. 157).
Beginning as early as June 10, 1950, and on at least
three different occasions thereafter (R. 610), Cle1nore
found that several of the monuments, Location Notiec~
and corner stakes on the Juanita Claims had been 111oved
by unknown persons to new and different locationR, or
had been obliterated entirely. The location 1nonu1nent~.
Notices of Location, and some corner stakes of Juanita #2
were moved to a point within the boundaries of Pro~
pector Clain1 #3 (R. 148). These n1onuments, along with
copies of the original Location Notices, were rephu·t>d
by Cle1nore in their original positions south of the north
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solid blue line of Juanita #1 and #2, being the north end
line thereof, as often as he found that they had been
disturbed (R. 171). On June 26, 1950, after observing
that his monuments and stal~es had been obliterated and
moved a second time, Clemore obtained certain "claim
cups", Exhibit 14, and he buried one containing the name
of each clai1n at the discovery monument of each of his
Juanita Clailns (R. 171). All of these "claim cups", except for Juanita #3, were in position at the site of the
original location monuments as of May, 1951, although
the actual monuments and many of the other markers
had been obliterated a third time. The discovery and
location monument of Juanita #3 was destroyed some
time prior to this by excavation work of the Defendants
(R. 172). Such of the corner stakes and location monuments of Plaintiffs' Juanita #3 as rema'ined in place in
November, 1950, were identified and "surveyed in" by
A. R. Shelton on Exhibit 5. Clemore further testified
that as of recent date a number of stakes and monuInents referring t<;> new mining locations claimed by the
D·efendants began to· make their appearance within the
boundaries of the J uanitas and the Debra Fraction #10.
We contend that the weight of the evidence clearly
shows that Plaintiffs Clemore and Cranford complied
with every affirmative legal requirement for the valid
location of Juanita #1, #2 and #3, and Debra F'raction
#10 Mining Claims, and that they were fully entitled
under said evidence to a Decree of the lower Court quieting___ their title thereto. It is admittedly true that Plain-
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tiffs' three Juanita Claims conflict with and cover substantially the same ground as D·efendants' Independence
Claim and two of the three Yellow Canarie Claims as
now situated. Also, Defendants' Debra Fraction #10
Claim conflicts with and covers substantially the sa1ne
ground as Defendants' Anita Gae, Grover Gibbs Fraction, "Fraction", and the other of Defendants' Yellow
Canarie Claims. We confess that we find it impossible,
and we sincerely state that this Court will find it iinpossible, to determine from the evidence and from the testimony of Defendant H. S.pencer Gibbs exactly \Yhere in
Area. #2 he now contends each of the Yellow Canarie
Claims is located. The constant shuffling back and forth
in Area #2 of the Yello\\. . Canarie Claims will be dealt
with in more detail under a separate heading hereinafter. Suffice it to say at this point that a careful exarnination of the original Notices of Location of the Yell ow
Canarie Claims, the testin1ony and maps of Plaintiffs'
and Defendants' own surveyors, and the testi1nony of
Defendant Gibbs and other witnesses clearly sho\v that
the Yellow Canarie Claims have shuttled back and forth
across Area #2 at least three times since they "floated"
into this Area.
Plaintiffs take the position that the Yellow Canarie
Claims, as now established on the ground covered hy
Juanita #1, #2 and #3 and Debra F'raction #10, \vere Yoid
and of absolutely no effect by reason of their having
been "transplanted" from their original site t\\?O 1niles
northeast of Marysvale, Utah, and "along the Old County
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Highway'' to this new area ·w·ithout benefit of any compliance with the statuto1·y requiren1ent of posting and
recording new Notices of Location showing the true and
correct location of said Claims. Therefore, the land now
occupied by the Yello'v Canarie Claims on Exhibit 5 was
open and unoccupied ground, su~ject to location for mining claims by the Plaintiffs on the dates of location of
their Claims.
The testimony of Clemore 'vith respect to the manner
and method of location of Juanita #1, #·2 and #3 and
Debra Fraction #10 Claims was clear and uncontroverted
and is substantiated by the physical evidence of such
of the discovery monuments and corner stakes.as remained in place at the time A. R. Shelton surveyed the area,
Exhibit 5. Defendants attack these locations, not by any
direct evidence going to the failure of Plaintiffs to properly locate their claims pursuant to statutory requirements, or to locate them in the areas Plaintiff Clemore
testified to, but rather by a great labyrinth of confusing,
contradictory and self-serving testimony that certain of
Plainiffs' monuments and corner stakes were observed
by them in other areas and within the boundaries of
other claims.
Plaintiffs do not dispute this. In fact, Clemore testified that on at least three differen't occasions after his
original discovery and staking work had been completed,
he found that his monuments and stakes had been moved
onto other claims, and Exhibit 5 shows that certain of
the Juanita and Debra Fraction #10 monuments and
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stakes were in fact within the boundaries of the Prospector and Independence Claims as of November, 1950.
However, a close inspection of the record 'vill sho"T that
all of the evidence concerning the movement of these
monuments and stakes fixes the time of n1ovement substantially after Plaintiffs' original discoveries. \Ve submit, therefore, that such evidence begs the question, and
utterly fails to destroy the validity of Plaintiffs' claims.
We deem it to be the clearly established law that once
having validly located their clain1s, Plaintiffs were not
required, as a matter of law, to preserve the original
monu1nents and stakes against meddleson1e persons or
trespassers or the acts of Defendants themselves, so long
as they did everything reasonably possible to preserve
their _original positions.
D. SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF DEFENDANTS IN MOVING, AMENDING, MODIFYING, CONFUSING AND OVERLAPPING CLAIMS IN AREA #2, INCLUDING THE MAKI;NG OF CONFLICTING NEW LOCATIONS.

We cannot here do justice to the fascinating narrative contained in the record of the restless and unreinitting "flight" of the Yell ow Canarie Claims back and
forth across Area #2 subsequent to their entry thereupon. We will call attention to the significant facts and
leave it to the Co'urt to read the record and draw its
conclusions therefrom concerning the motives behin'i the
shuffle of these claims.
'Since Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs stoutly Inaintained that his Yell ow Canarie Claims were originally lo-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

cated in Area #2, he must of necessity rely upon his original Notices of Location for these Claims to give him
the priority in tune required for this area. No Jnatter
how said Notices of I.Jocation 1nay be interpreted upon
other points, vve subn1it that upon this issue they are
susceptible of but one interpretation, to-wit: As originally located, vvhether in Area #1 or #2, Yell ow Canarie
Claim #1 \\yas the south clailn, Exhibit "A." Yell ow
Canarie #2 was north of Yellow Canarie #1, Exhibit "B"
(R. 329). Yellow Canarie #3 was west of Yellow Canarie
#2, Exhibit "C". Under cross-examination, Defendant
H. Spencer Gibbs fixed the discovery monument of his
Yellow Canarie #1 (as he contended he originally located
it, but which is now shown as Yellow Canarie #2 on Exhibit 5, being the southeast Yellow Canarie Claim) by
placing a red "X" on said Exhibit 5 just south of the
southwest corner of Prospector Claim #3 (R. 313-4). By
following the directional course of Yellow Canarie #1
as contained in the Notice of Location, Exhibit "A", it is
obvious that Yellow Canarie #1 extended 750 feet north
from said red "X", directly over and into Prospector #3.
In fact, Gibbs acknowledged (R. 320) that his north end
line of Yellow Canarie #1, as he contended he originally
located it, was on the common sideline of Prospector #2
and #3, Exhibit 5. The south end line of Yellow Canarie
#1 he fixed as being midway between the present north
and south end lines of Yellow Canarie #2, the southeast
Yellow Canarie Claim, as shown on Exhibit 5 (R. 321).
Gibbs also admitted that the south end line of Yellow
Canarie #1 as he- contends he originally located it waG
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moved south from its original location to connect up \Vith
the north end line of Independence Claim (R. 322). He
says he also moved ~he north end line of Yell ow Canarie
#1 south a distance of about 700 feet. This was done for
the obvious reason that Yellow Canarie #1, as he says it
was placed originally, lay directly over Prospector #3.
It was necessary to move the Claims south to avoid a
conflict with the prior Prospector Clailns (R. 325). The
net result of this maneuver was to leave a wide gap between the north end line of Yellow Canarie #1 (now
shown as Yellow Canarie #2 on Exhibit 5) and the south
end line of Yellow Canarie #2 (now shovvn as Yello'v Canarie #1 on said Exhibit and on Defendants' Exhibit
"AA"). This is directly contra.ry to the description contained in the Notice of Location of Yell ow Canarie #2,
Exhibit "B", as it states therein that Yellow Canarie #2
joins the north end line of Yellow Canarie #1.
The Amended Notice of Location for Yellow Canarie
#1, Exhibit "D·", recites on its face that Yellow Canarie
#1 as amended "joins Yell ow Canarie Claim #3 east side
line." Therefore, by Defendants' own recorded declarations, sometime subsequent to the original establishment
of Yell ow Canarie Claims in Area #2, the Yellovv Canarie
#3 was moved from its original location west of Yell ow
Canarie #2, being the northeast Yell ow Canarie Claim as
Gibbs says he located them and as they are described in
the original Notices of Location, Exhibits "A", "B", "C",
south to a point where its east side line joined the "~est
side line of Yellow Canarie #1, the southeast ·Yellow Ca-
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narie Claim. The net result of this maneuver was to
make Yellow Canarie #3 and #1 parallel in position, completely contrary to their descriptions and to their original
placements. According to Gibbs' latest and best estimate,
the Claims remained in this position as of the date of
trial that is Yeli ow Canarie #3 is west of Yell ow Canarie
' ow 'Canarie #2 is north of both Yell ow Canarie
#1; Yell
#1 and #3, but that there is a wide gap between the north
end line of Yell ow Canarie #1 and the south end line of
Yellow Canarie #2. In this connection, it is interesting
to note that Gibbs' testimony concerning the present relative positions of the Yellow_ Canarie Claims in Area #2
was directly contrary to his testimony concerning said
matters at his Deposition prior to the trial (R. 331).
When the original positions of the Yellow Canarie
Claims in Area #2 are projected onto Exhibit 5 in relation to the locations thereon of the Prospector Claims,
the reasons why Gibbs was so anxious to move YelJow
Canarie #1 and #3 to new areas become apparent, no
matter how this dubious shuffle might have to be consummated. The fact of the matter is that Gibbs was not well
acquainted with Area #2 and existing Claims there when
he moved the Yellow Canaries into that area. In order
to place their locations in the same relative positions they
occupied in Area #1 and as required by his Notices of
Location, he was forced to place the north half of Yellow
Canarie #1, the south half of Yell ow Canarie #2, and all
of Yell ow Canarie #3 directly over the prior and existing
Prospector Claims. As soon as Gibbs discovered this
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fact, he shuttled these three clain1s around in a frantic
attempt to avoid conflict with the Prospector group, and
yet to preserve his original location date.
Furthermore, wherever Gibbs may choose to place
the present location for these Yellow Canarie Clailns in
Area #2, we note that the stakes and monuments observed on the ground in connection with these clain1s in
1950 and prior to this action by A. R. Shelton and as
"surveyed in" by him on Exhibit 5, show that Yellow Canarie #1 was then the north claim, that Yello\v Canarie
#2 was south thereof, and that Yellow Canarie #3 \\Tas
west of Yell ow Canarie #2. Hence, we think that it n1ay
be said that the Yell ow Canarie Claims had changed
positions once again. We note with satisfaction, and
we feel certain that the Court will recognize the significance of the fact, that Defendants' own engineer and surveyor, George H. Ryan, established the locations of the
Yellow Canarie Claims on his map, Exhibit "AA", in substantial conformity to Shelton's survey of the area. A
careful examination of these two maps will show that
there is no rna terial conflict between them as to the location of the Yellow Canarie Claims in Area #2 from physical evidence thereof upon the ground. The fact re1nain:-;
that both surveys and maps disagree with Gibbs' own
testimony.
Thus it becomes apparent that even after the Yellow
Canarie Claims came into Area #2, not a single one of
them remained quiescent. Like true, frustrated \varbler~~
the Yell ow Canarie Claims hopped back and forth,
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around and about, at the direction of their owner. We
assert that, even assuming that the Yellow Canarie
Claims had their original origin in Area #2, which we
deny, still the fact of their constant unremitting movement across Area #2 renders them void and of no legal
effect as valid mining locations. The orderly development of mining locations abhors such flaunting of the
letter and spirit of every rule of mining law.
To further camouflage the invalidity of the Yellow
Canarie Claims, to further confuse the situation, and in a
frantic effort to bolster his obviously invalid locations,
Gibbs then proceeded to amend his Yellow Canaries,
Exhibits "D" "E" and "F" and introduced into the
'
'
'
same Area #2 entirely new, conflicting and overlapping
clain1s as follows : Independence, Exhibit "G"; Independence Fraction, Exhibit "H"; Anita Gae #1, Exhibit
"I"; Grover Gibbs Fraction, Exhibit "J"; Fraction, Exhibit "L"; Yellow Canarie Fraction, Exhibit "M"; Yellow Canarie Fractions #1, #2 and #4, Exhibits "0", "P"
and "Q". The ultimate confusion is such that in the Findings and Decree, no mention is made of several claims
covered by Defendants' Exhibits and testimony. Title to
one claim (Grover Gibbs F·raction #2) .is quieted although there is no proof in the record of any such claim.
Further, no attempt is made in said Decree to show the
location of any of Defendants' Claims, which ones arp
valid and which invalid as covering the same ground and
discoveries, and how, where, and with which of Defendants' Claims the Plaintiffs' Claims conflict. We share the
.
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confusion ·of Defendants' counsel and the lower Court and
appreciate and understand their inability to determine
the actual locations of Defendants' Claims and the identity of the Claims on which Defendants are actually
relying.
POINT 2.
THAT THE DECREE ENTERED HEREIN IS AGAINST
THE LAW.

Appellants respectfully take the position that in view
of all of the testimony and evidence in this case, the refusal of the trial Court to enter a Decree quieting Plaintiffs' title to the three Juanita Mining Claims and to the
Debra F·raction #10 Mining claim was and is contrary
to law. We contend that a proper application of proven
facts to governing principles of law by this Court will
require a reversal of the Decree entered by the lower
Court with directions to enter a new Decree quieting
Plaintiffs' title. We base this contention upon the followIng:
(A) DEFENDANT H. SPENCER GIBBS, HAVING
ONCE ESTABLISHED HIS YELLOW CANARIE CLAIMS
AT A GIVEN LOCATION, IS THEREAFTER BOUND BY
HIS ACTS AND DECLARATIONS AND HE MAY NOT
SUBSEQUENTLY CLAIM NEW GROUND IN AN ENTIRELY
DIFFERENT PHYSICAL AREA (AREA #2) UNDER THE
PRIORITY DATE OF HIS ORIGINAL LOCATION IN AREA
#1 WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH LAW AS TO THE LOCATION OF THE CLAIMS IN THE NEW AREA.

The policy and general purpose declared by the
several acts of the Federal Congress relating to the ar-
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quisition of rights in the public do1nain for 1nining purposes has been to encourage the. orderly and economic
development of the country's mineral resources. The
several states have power to regulate the location of
mining claims \vhere such regulations are not in conflict
with the Federal Constitution and Laws. In this jurisdiction, beginning with the laws of 1899, our Legislature
has enacted regulatory and procedural laws for the
orderly location of mining claims. These laws are found
in Title 40, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, being
the same provisions as Title 55, Chapter 1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943. We quote the pertinent sections of
said laws as follows :
"40-1-2. Discovery Monument-Notice of Location-Contents.

The locator, at the time of making a discovery of such vein or lode must erect a monument
at the place of discovery and p·ost thereon his
notice of location which shall contain:

1.

The name of the claim.

2.

The name of the locator or locators.

3.

The date of location.

4.

If a lode claim, the number of linear feet
claimed in length along the course of the
vein each way from the point of discovery, with the width claimed on each
side of the center of the vein, and the
general course of the vein or lode as near
as may be, an.d such a description of the
claim, located by reference to some na-
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tural object or perntanent 1nonn1nent as
will identify the claim ..."
"40-1-3.

Boundaries to be Marked.

!\:fining claims and millsites must be distinctly
marked on the ground so that the boundaries
thereof can be readily traced.
"40-1-4. Copy of Location Notice to be R.ecorded.
Within thirty days after the date of posting
the Location Notice upon the claim, the locator
or locators, or his or their assigns, must file for
record in the office of the county record of the
county in which such claim is located a substantial
copy of such Notice of Location ... "
We regard it as too well settled to require citation
of authorities that the Notice of Location referred to in
40-1-2 above is required for the purpose of proper identification of the physical location of a mining claim, and
when said Notice is properly recorded it furnishes constructive notice to all the world of the contents contained
therein and establishes a priority of location for the clai1n
described in said No-tic e. For the purpose of securing the
definite and plain description of a mining claim which the
above cited statutes require and to direct attention in a
general way to the locality in which the clailn can be
found, the statutes provide that the record of 1nining
claims shall contain a description of the claim by reference to some natural object or permanent n1onmnent
(Hammer vs. Garfield Mining etc. Company, 130 lT.R.
291).
We are prepared to acknowledge, and we recognize
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it to be the law, that if the original Notices of Location
of the Y ello'v Canarie #1, #2 and #3 as recorded by Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs on Aprjl26, April26, and June
8, 1949, respectively, Exhibits "A", "B", and "C", had
properly described said clain1s by reference to natural
objects or permanent n1onuments sufficient to identify
the san1e and to give constructive notice to subsequent
locators and if, in addition, said Claims had then been
located correctly on the ground in Area #2 and in accordance with the Notices, then Gibbs 'vould have had a
clear priority of location as to Yellow Canarie #1; and
Yellow Canaries #2 and #3 would not have conflicted with
Plaintiffs' Juanita Claims. By the same token, we deem
it to be the law that if the descriptions contained in said
Notices of Location did not properly describe said Claims
with reference to natural objects or permanent monuments as to identify the land actually claimed by Gibbs,
then said Notices of Location were legal nullities and
any priority claimed thereunder is subsequent and inferior to the rights of an intervening locator who meets
the requirements of law regarding mining locations. The
same result would follow if the prior claims were not
correctly established on the ground.
This Court has on at least two occasions applied this
rule to varying factual situations. In the early case of
Copper Globe Mining Comp·any 'vs. Allman et al} 23 Utah
410, 64 P. 1019, this Court held:
"A mining location is not perfected until all
of the essential statutory requirements are per-
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formed. A locator of a mining claim only acquires
exclusive right to the possession of the claim ""hen
all of the necessary requirements for a location
ai~ observed; and, if he neglects to perform any
necessary requirements within the time prescribed
by statute, his attempted location is of no avail
against an intervening location peaceably and
regularly made and covering the same ground, although he shall have performed the neglected requirement after the inception of the second location."

In the later case of M iehlich et al vs. Tintic Standard
Mining Compa.ny, 60 Utah 569, 211 P. 686, this Court
held:
"Where a notice of location of a mining
claim failed to describe the land claimed and no
amended notice was posted and recorded describing the boundaries until after other parties had
located a conflicting claim, the latter, having 1net
all of the requirements of the statutes relative to
the holding of their claim were properly awarded
the conflict area."
In Wiltsee vs. King of Arizona Mining & Milling
Company, 7 Arizona 95, 60 P. 896, the Supre1ne Court
of Arizona held regarding a situation where the locator
changed the easterly end of the claims from where it was
first located by his Location Notice to a point 800 feet
northerly as fixed by the Location Certificate, as follows:
"If a locator of a mining claim, \V hen posting
his notice of location, in addition to giving the
general course of his vein, places Inonuinents at
the center of each end line thereof, thus giving
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definite notice to subsequent locators as to the
meaning of his notice, he is bound thereby, and
cannot thereafter, during the time prescribed
by law for perfecting his location, change the
course of his location to the p-rejudice of intervening rights."
Also, the Supreme Court of Colorado has adopted
the same rule in the case of Washington Gold lJfining &
Milling Compa.ny vs. O'Laughlin, 46 Colorado 503, 105 P.
1092, wherein the identity of the claims as situated upon
the ground varied materially from the wording of the
Location Notice:
"Where the original location certificate of a
mining location was insufficient because so defective as to prevent one from identifying or designating the claim on the ground, an amended certificate could not include other or different territory so as to injure intervening rights."
To the same effect are Golden Fleece Gold & Silver
Mining Compamy vs. Cable Consolidated Gold & Silver
Mining Company, 12 Nev. 312; Nelson vs. Smith, 42 Nev.
302, 176 P. 261; Ringling vs. Mahurin, 59 Montana 38, 197
P. 829; Bair vs. Anderson, 98 Colo. 532, 58 P. 2d 484.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held in the case of
Brown vs. Levarn, 4 Idaho 794, 46 P. 661, as follows:
"Where the description and reference to a
natural object or permanent monument is of such
a character that a mining engineer could not find
the claim from the Location Notice and where
it is such that the claim may be floated anywhere
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to suit the ground or to cover ore that may have
been since discovered, it is clearly such a ~~ otice
as cannot furnish a foundation for a valid location."
The S·upreme Court of California has like,vise held
in the case of Mutchmor vs. McCarty, 149 Calif. 603, 87
P. 85, where aN otice of Location of a lode claim failed to
contain a description of the claim by a reference to a
natural object or permanent monun1ent by which it could
be identified as required by the Revised Statutes of the
United States, Section 2324, it was ineffective for any
purpose.
See also Walton vs. Wild Goose, Mining Company,
123 F. 209; McCGJY~~Yt vs. McMillam, 129 Calif. 350, 62 P.
31.
The sufficiency of the location of a mining claim
with reference to natural objects or permanent monuments, ordinarily is a question of fact (Bonanza Consolidated Minilng Company vs. Golden Head MininrJ Company, 29 Utah 159, 80 P. 736; Wells vs. Davis, 22 lJtah
322, 6'2 P. 3; F·arming-ton Gold Mining Con1pany vs.
Rhymney Gold arnd Copper Company, 20 Utah 363, !1R P.
832). We submit that the weight of Plaintiffs' evidence
concerning the actual location and identity of the natural
objects and fixed monuments referred to in the Notires
of Location of Yellow Canarie Claims #1 and #2 (Exhibits "A" and "B") to-wit: "Along Old County Tiighway
two miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah," when considered in the light of Defendants' evidence, was sufficient to
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require the trial Court to conclude that Defendant Gibbs
located his Yellow Canarie Claims along the east side
of the Old Piute County Highway approximately two
miles northeast of l\Iarysvale, Utah, (Area #1) and not
in Area #2 as he no"\v contends. Furthermore, even in
Area #2 and considering only Defendants' evidence, their
claims were not validly located but were moved back and
forth, around and about, until finally not even the Defendants knew where their claims were. Furthermore,
we contend that the trial Court should have found as a
matter of law that because of the variance between the
declarations contained in Defendants' Notices as to location and the actual locations thereof on the ground their
claims were defective.
F·or all these reasons, the locations of the Yell ow
Canarie Claims in Area #2 were void and no priority
should have been awarded to Defendant Gibbs thereon.
The orderly development of mineral lands on the public
don1ain requires such a ruling to prohibit the odious practice of "floating" claims from one area (Area #1) to another (Area #2) or within the boundaries of one area
(Area #2), in order to grab up· every valuable location
site as its value becomes known. A location of a mining
clai1n must be good when made, and each claimant must
stand on his own location and may take only what it will
give him under the law.
(B) THE AMENDED NOTICES OF LOCATION OF
DEFENDANTS' YELLOW CANARIE CLAIMS DO NOT CURE
THE FATAL DEFECTS IN THEIR ORIGINAL NOTICES.
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Exhibits "D" "E" and "F" are amended Notices of
'
Location for the Yellow
Canarie Clain1s #1, #2 and #3, respectively. Although these Notices recite that their purpose was " ... to more fully describe this claim location
to correct previous mistakes and discrepancies ... ", Exhibit "D"; " ... for the purpose of more fully describing
the position to adjoining claims also to correct corner
post numbers the changing of location notice by persons
unknown to me ... ", Exhibit "E"; and " ... for the purpose of correcting any errors in the original location,
of more accurately and definitely describing and defining th~ location and of taking in and acquirilng any
ground that may have become open to location since the
making of said original location ... ", Exhibit "F"; nevertheless, a comparision of the descriptions of the ground
actually sought to be claimed by these Amended Notices
of Location with the descriptions contained in the corresponding original Notices for the Yellow Canarie Claims,
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", and a consideration of the
testimony of H. S·pencer Gibbs concerning his real intention in amending the Yellow Canarie Claims will, we
feel, convince this Court that the ultimate purpose of
said Amended Notices of Location was to change the relative positions of said Claims in Area #2, to alter the
physical size and shape of the Claims, and to take up
entirely different ground under a priority date of the
original Notices of Location for the respective Clain1s.
We assert that amendments of this type are absolutely
void under the law, and therefore the amendatory correr-
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tions sought to be achieved thereby do not relate back
to the date of originalloca tion of said Clain1s.
The original Notice of Location of Yellow Canarie
#1 describes a mining clain1 1500 feet in length by 600
feet in width, and it fixes the location thereof in Area #1.
By Defendant Gibbs' own admission, the Amended Notice
of Location on Yell ow Canarie #'1, Exhibit "D", describes
a claim 300 feet in length and 600 feet in width (R. 326)
but places the location thereof in an entirely ne\v and different area (Area #2). Further, Gibbs ad1nitted on the
one hand that the net effect of this amendment \Vas to reduce Yellow Canarie #1 by four-fifths of its original size
(R. 326), but on the other hand, he maintained that the
Claim as amended covered the same identical ground as
before the amendment (R. 326). The original Notice of
Location of Yellow Canarie #2, Exhibit "B", fixed its location north of Yellow Canarie #1 and "along Old County
Highway". By amendment, Exhibit "F", the location
of the claim is tied to the north side line of the Prospector
Claims in Area #2 as shown on Exhibit 5. The record
is so replete with evidence of fact that the Old Piute
County Highway referred to in the original Notice of Location of Yellow Canarie #2 is removed from any point
in Area #2 by approximately two _miles that we will make
no further reference to the matter. Comparing the location of this Claim as set forth in the original Notice o.f
Location thereof with the purported location as attempted to be established by its Amended Notice of Location, it is obvious that the amendment of Yellow Canarie
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#2 describes a new and different claint tn an entirely
new and different area.
In the original Notice of Location of Yellow Canarie
#3, Exhibit "C", the Claim is fixed as being west of
Yellow Canarie #2. By amendment thereof, Exhibit "F",
the position of Yell ow Canarie #3 is likewise placed "rest
of Yell ow Canarie #2, but the more significant fact is that
the amendment of Yellow Canarie #1, Exhibit "D", says
that Yellow· Canarie #3 was then west of Yellow Canari.e
#1. We challenge the Defendant to show to this Court
how it is possible for Yellow Canari.e #3 after a1nendment
to be west of Yellow Canarie #1, when originally it 'vas
\vest of Yellow Canarie #2, unless the Claim by amendment had been moved substantially south of its original
position. A claim 1500 feet long cannot be stretched to
twice its length.· It is at once obvious that by a1nendn1ent
Yellow Canarie #3 was moved to a point south of its
original position. All of the physical evidence on the
ground found by both A. R. Shelton and George H. Ryan,
the Engineers and Surveyors, substantiates this fact.
Their maps clearly show that after amendment in 1950
the position of Yellow Canarie #3 had radically changed
from its original position as the north,vest Clailn lorate(l
west of Yellow Canarie #2.
We contend that since the original Notices of Location for the Yellow Canarie Claims were void, the fatal
defects therein contained could not be cured by ainendment of said Claims, even assuming that the a1nend1nents
in all respects complied with governing la\\·. Jn support
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thereof 've cite to the Court the leading Colorado case
of Sulli.van et al vs. Sharp et al, 33 Colo. 3±6, 80 P. 1054,
wherein it is held as follo,vs:
'•The right of a locator to file an additional
certificate (amendment) can only avail him where
there was an original location valid though imperfect."
In the more recent case of S ackville vs. },fann et al.,
135 P. 2d 101-±, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed
the rule above cited and held as follows :
"Where the original location of a m1n1ng
claim was void, such a void location cannot be
made valid by filing an additional location certificate (amendn1ent) under statute providing for the
filing of an additional certificate to cure a defective original certificate."
See also Johnson vs. Young, 18 Colo. 625, 34 P. 173;
Strepy vs. Stark, 7 Colo. 614, 5 P. 111; and Moyle vs.
Bullene et al, 7 Colo. A. 308, 44 P. 69.
Moreover, even if the Court determines that the original Notices of Location on the Yello'v Canarie Claims
were not void, still, for the factual reasons outlined
above, the subsequent amendments to. the Yellow Canarie
Claims are nevertheless invalid since they constitute an
attempt to add new and different ground and to acquire
new and different rights in the Defendants to·the prejudice of Plaintiffs' lawful rights in Area #2 and which had
accrued between the date of original location of the
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Yellow Canarie Claims and the dates of amendments
thereto.
The Supreme Court of California in the case of
Gobert vs. Butterfield, et al, 136 P. 516, has held,:
"An amended notice of location of a mining
claim relates back to the original Notice notwithstanding intervening locations, if made to cure ob. vious defects iln the original notice without including any new ground."
The Federal rule appears to be identical. Bunker
Hill & Sulliva-n Mining d!; Concentrating Company vs.
Empire State - Idaho Mining & Development Cornpany,
~34 F. 268, holds as follows:
"While a mining location may be amended
without the forfeiture of any rights acquired by
the original location except such as are inconsistent with the amendment, no new right can be had
which is inconsistent with those acquired by other
locators made between the dates of the original
and such amended-location."
In the Washington Gold Mining & Milling Compan;y
vs. 0' Laughlin case, supra, the Supreme Court of Colorado has held :
"Where the original location certificate of the
mining location was insufficient because so defe('tive as to prevent one from identifying or designating the claim on the ground, an amended certificate could not include other or different territory so as to injure intervening rights.''
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See also Morris on et al vs. Regan, 8 Idaho 291, 6·7
P. 955; Bismark ]}fountain Gold Mining Company vs.
North Sunbeam Gold Conzpan,y, 14 Idaho 516, 95 P. 14.
Without Inore, "\Ve urge upon the Court the necessity
of establishing in this jurisdiction the rule of authority
prevailing in the other \Yestern mining states that amendments of Notices of Location to mining claims of the type
before the Court are void and of no curative effect whatsoever and do not relate back to the priority date of the
original Notices of Location.
(C) PLAINTIFFS, HAVING COMPLIED WITH EVERY
AFFIRMATIVE LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE LOCATIONS OF THE THREE JUANITA CLAIMS AND THE
DEBRA FRACTION #10, AND BEING FREE FROM ANY
FRAUD OR DECEPTION THEREIN, IN -EQUITY AND
JUSTICE SHOULD NOT BE DIVESTED OF THEIR RIGHTS
BY REASON OF THE SUBSEQUENT DESTRUCTION,
MOVEMENT OR OBLITERATION OF THEIR STAKES AND
MONUMENTS BY OTHERS.

As we read the record we conclude that the only direct attack made upon Plaintiffs' mining locations by the
Defendants other than their assertion that their Yello'N
Canarie Claims were prior in time in Area #2 to those
of the Plaintiffs, which assertion we feel we have shown
to the Court to be entirely fictitious, is their testimo~y
that certain of Plaintiffs' monuments and corner stakes
were observed by them in other areas and within the
boundaries of other claims. As heretofore pointed out,
· Plaintiff Clemore acknowledged that his markers and
monuments had been moved onto other claims at least
three different times subsequent to his original locations,
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and Exhibit 5 shows that this condition existed in Novenl·
ber, 1950, all in spite of every preventive measure Cl-:more could take. We call attention to the fact, however,
that all of the evidence on this point comes either from
the Defendants then1selves or from their agents. \Y.e feel,
therefore, that such evidence should be cautiously considered in the light of possible self-preserving motives.
Moreover, it is well settled law that a locator, having
complied with statutory requirements for the location
of his claims, cannot be divested of his lawful right~
therein by the removal or obliteration of his 1nonu1nents
and stakes. We cite as authority for this proposition
the recent decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in the
case of Nichols et al. vs. Ora Taho1na Mining Company
et al, 151 P. 2d 615, wherein the Court discusses this
matter at length and holds as follows:
"The general rule is that when a location is
once sufficiently marked on the surface so that its
boundaries can be readily traced and all other acts
of location are performed as required by law, the
right of possession is fully vested in the locator.
and he cannot be divested of his right by the removal or obliteration or destruction of the monuments, stakes, marks or notices done without hi~
fault, while he continues to perforn1 the necessary
work upon the claim."
To the same effect is Gobert vs. Butterfield, fron1
the California Supreme Court, supra, wherein the Court
holds on this point:

"If a mining claim is sufficiently 1narked on
the ground, and all necessary acts of Iocn tion are
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done the right thereby acquired by the locator
cann~t be divested by the subsequent obliteration
of the location 1narks or removal of the stakes
without the locator's fault, and the fact that the
stakes cannot afterwards be found places no inf·erence against the sufficiency of the original
markings."
See also Book vs. Justice Mining Co1npa,ny, 5S F.
106; Steele vs. Preble, 77 P. 2d 418; Moore vs. Steelsmith,
1 Alaska 121; 2 Lindley on JJ[ ines, 3rd Ed., Section 375,
Page 890, n. 68 ; 1 Snyder on Mines, Section 399 ; 36 A'm.
Jur. IJ!Iines &·Minerals, Section 94, Page 346; Shamel,
Mining ll,!ilneral a.nd Geological Law, Sec. 530; 40 C.J.
Mines and Minerals, Sec. 212, p. 801, n. 64.
(D) APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF "GOOD
FAITH."

Plaintiffs located their Debra Fraction #10 and three
Juanita Claims in Area #2 with prior knowledge of the
fact that Defendants had fraudulently "floated" their
Yell ow Canarie Claims from Area #1 into Area #2, and
that therefore Defendants' Claims were utterly void.
Realizing the fraudulent conduct of the Defendants and
knowing of the complete invalidity of Defendants' purported locations in Area #2, Plaintiffs made a peaceful
entry in Area #2 pursuant to their lawful rights as citizens of the United States to locate mining claims upon
open and unoccupied public lands. Plaintiffs acted in
complete good faith for they did no more than they had
a lawful right to do. On the other hand, Defendants' conduct from the beginning date of April 25, 1949, and the
original locations as of that date in Area #1 continuing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

60
up to and including the trial itself and including the
"floating" of their Claims fron1 Area #1 to Area #2, the
shuffling of their locations in Area #2, their acts in
amending and moving existing claims, changing relative
positions, and adding new, overlapping and conflicting
claims were obviously fraudulent as to both the {Tnited
States and all other parties interested in Area #2, and
demonstrate an utter lack of that "good faith" required
of those who seek to locate mining claims.
If Defendants had been in good faith, they could
have made entirely new and complete locations in Area
#2 when they finally entered that Area, but instead they
sought to preserve the priority dates given them, if they
succeeded in their fraud, by their original locations in
Area #1. When they entered Area #2 they knew of prior
claims in that Area, so in an attempt to defeat and antedate those claims they relied on· "floating" instead of
"locating". The instant action is a result of that fraudulent conduct on Defendants' part.
Appellants fully agree with the salutary doctrine
of law that in possessory actions of this type good faith
upon the part of one locating mining claims is a factor
to be concluded. Several of the cases heretofore cited
make reference to this doctrine. In Bismark Ill in.in.q
Company vs. North Sunbeam Company, supra, the Court
said:
''It is the well settled doctrine of all of the
later decisions that location notices and rerords
should receive a liberal eonstruction to the end
of upholding a location 1nade in good faith.··
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Said case also quotes 'vith approval the following
from Londonderry 1llining Company vs. United G. M.
Company, 38 Colo. 480, 88 P. 455, as follows:
"Every case where this question is raised
must· therefore depend upon its own circunlstances. As previously stated, the purpose of such
location certificate is to give notice to subsequent
locators; and if by reasonable construction the
language descriptive of the status of a claim, aided or unaided by testimony, will do so it is sufficient in this respect. In other words, the object
of requiring a reference to a natural objeet or permanent monument is to furnish means by which
to identify the ·claim, and whatever reference will
accomplish this object satisfies the law."
It is said in the annotation entitied Location of Mining Claims, in 7 L.R.A., N.S-. 763, as to the purpose of the
requirement of marking upon the ground, at Page 856:
"The object of the law in requiring the location of the mining claim to be marked upon the
ground is to fix the claim and prevent swinging
or floating so that those who in good faith are
looking for unoccupied ground in the vicinity
of previous locations may be able to ascertain exactly what has been appropriated in order to make
the locations upon the residue."
See also Johnson vs. Ryan, 43 N.M. 127, 86 P. 2d
1040. This doctrine is well stated in the California case
of Brown vs. Murphy, 97 P. 2d 281, wherein ·the· Court
said:
"A person who knows that a mining .claim is
in the actual possession of another cannot honestly
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believe that it is vacant and subject to entry and
relocation; and the entry under such circumstanees cannot be made in good faith unless it is
made upon some right or color of right or clahn
of legal right to m.ake the entry. Such a claint
of right must exist before the entry to constitute
good faith in making the entry.
"If it does not exist, the entry is made without
color of right or color of title and is an entrY in
bad faith for actual possession in ·another is prima
facie evidence of ti tie· in the possessor and is protected in the law against lawless invasion 'vithout
right or color of right, but one who has a title and
present right of possession may also take peaceable possession of what he claims to ~e his own."

But the Court also qualifies the application of this
doctrine as follows:
"It is true, generally speaking, that any competent locator, for the purpose of negotiating a
location for himself, may enter upon mineral land
of the United States which is not covered b.u rali:l
subsisting locatio-n., even though it be in the actual
possession of another, but still said entry n1ust he
peaceable and in good faith."
A careful consideration of the cases and authorities
above cited will show that the prohibition against subsequent entry up,on areas already in the possession of a
prior claimant applies to situations where there had been
but a very technical or unimportant failure on the part of
the prior claimants to co1nply with the law regarding
the location of mining clailns. In Dennis v~. Banu:tf,
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85 P. :2d 916, the description eontained in the Notices of
Location was somewhat vague, but still sufficient to
properly identify the location of the clain1. In Johnson
vs. Ryan., supra, there. had been a failure to record the
Notices of Location, although every other require1nen t
of la-\v had been con1plied 'vith. ·In Eaton vs. Norris, 63
P. 856, the relocator had "been watching the Plaintiff
during the summer of 1897, to see if he did the required
amount of assessment work on his clain1" (page 857). In
Brown vs~ Murphy, supra, the parties seeking to relocate
the claims relied upon the fact that the exterior boundaries of the claims had not been marked and that there
existed discrepancies or variations in the instruments
comprising the owner's chain of title. The evidence further showed that the relocator had been on the premises
on numerous occasions for several years prior to the
action, had taken san1ples of ore therefrom with the permission of the owners of the claims, and had unsuccessfully attempted to lease the property f'rom the known
owners prior to the action.

We contend that the facts and evidence presented to
the trial Court clearly negative the application of any
"good faith" doctrine herein in favor of Defendants. In
the case at bar, the Yellow Canarie Claims as located
in Area #2 were not merely defective by reason of a technical non-compliance with the letter of the law, but were
absolutely void. For the numerous reasons heretofore
stated said Claims had violated the fundamental precepts of basic mining law. After all, the object of the law
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in requiring the location of a mining claim to be marked
upon the ground is to fix the location of the clai1n and to
prevent floatilng so that those who are looking for unoccupied ground may be able to ascertain exactly what
has been appropriated in order to make locations upon
the residue. Liberality in the interpretation of Location
Notices to the end that honest though inept locations will
be protected must son1ewhere give way to the prerogative
of other 1niners to pursue their lawful rights on the public
domain. Otherwise, a truly chaotic condition will result
and the Courts will be led into the gr'evious error of encouraging the "floating" of claims at the caprice of any
locator who, ·having once placed his claim, thereafter
finds a "greener pasture." If Defendants are allowed
to suceeed in this action and if their conduct is countenanced by this Court,_ the orderly development of the
Marysvale uranium area and of other mineral sections
will be jeopardized. Our Courts will be confronted 'vith
numerous cases involving the "floating" of clain1s, and
no locator will be safe from the "jumping" of his claim
by one who moves into a Inore valuable area a clain1 he
has located originally in a section which proves to be of
little or no value. Justice and fair dealing require a
reversal of the Decree and judgment of the lower Court.
POINT 3.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
LAW.

Plaintiffs make no separate argu1nent relative to the
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lower Court's rulings on admission of evidence at the
trial.
POINT 4.
THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AND RECORD IN THIS CAUSE, NEW FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ENTERED.

For .the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs submit
that they are entitled to new Findings, Conclusions and
Decree in their favor.
POINT 5.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Plaintiffs assert that for all the reasons set forth
above, the lower Court committed error in denying their
Motion for a New Trial, and submit that said Court,
pursuant to Rule 59(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
should have made New Findings, Conclusions and, Judgment in Plaintiffs' favor.
CONCLUSION
Appellants contend that the evidence and testimony
presented to the lower Court clearly entitle them to a
Decree quieting their title to their Juanita #1, #2 and #3
and D'ebra Fraction #10 Claims against each and every
claim of Defendants conflicting therewith and subject
only to the paramount title of the United States of America, and preventing, enjoining and restraining the De-
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fendants from asserting any right, title or claim in and to
the mining claims of the Plaintiffs above described. The
pivotal question of the case is simply this : ,.Vas the
ground located by Plaintiff Fred C. Clemore as the
Juanita #1, #2 and #3 and Debra Fraction #10 Claims
open and unoccupied land subject to location for n1ining
claims on their respective dates of location by PlaintiffT
We have confidence that this Court will ans,ver said
question affirmatively in Plaintiffs' favor. All other
questions presented by the evidence clearly resolve themselves in Plaintiffs' favor for the record is silent upon
any other attack upon Plaintiffs' locations. The result
of the Defendants' present position in this action is on
its face so grossly inequitable as to be unconscionable.
We submit that for all of the reasons heretofore stated,
the decision of the trial Court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
CARVEL MATTSSON

and
JOHN T. VERNIEU
FOR GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants
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